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Using modal notions, such as possibly, might be, allowed, must, necessarily, 
etc. seems to be an inevitable practice of our daily life, as well as, our scien-
tifi c and philosophical discussions. Even if we do not believe in the existence 
of modal facts per se, or in their semantic transparency and logical consis-
tency, their adoption to our vocabularies seems to be more than expedient.
Andrea Borghini’s A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Modality is 
about the various philosophical theories of modalities that are on the table in 
the contemporary debates. Actually, her book is the very fi rst monograph writ-
ten in a concise textbook-style on the current theories of modality and not just 
of possible worlds that are closely related to almost all discussions of modality.
A very specifi c narrative of twentieth-century analytic philosophy could be 
written about philosophers’ attitudes towards the modalities: a wide range of 
arguments might be reconstructed from skepticism to maximal and critical ac-
ceptance of such notions as possibility and necessity. The book of Borghini is 
written with respect to these two notions: six chapters are about what is possi-
ble—with a hint on necessities—and one is about necessity per se. (Though this 
might be considered as extremely unbalanced, this practice was quite widely 
shared also in the last fi fty years among the different approaches to modality.)
Altogether the book consists of eight chapters and a preliminary intro-
duction. The seven chapters on the theories of modality (I will come back 
to the fi st historical chapter separately below) are organized in accordance 
with a classifi catory fi gure adapted in the volume (see p. 17). The fi rst ques-
tion addressed by Borghini is whether modal notions express concepts or 
not. If one answers that they do not, she ends up either with skepticism 
or expressivism. The par excellence modal skeptic is W. v. O. Quine, but 
Borghini discusses Peter van Inwagen’s epistemic skepticism and the so-
called radical modal skepticism. What is shared among them is that they 
suspend their judgments of given modal sentences for various reasons. The 
other option, modal expressivism, “takes sentences containing modalities to 
express the speaker’s conformity to a certain conventional way of regarding 
the non-modal content of the sentences” (65).
Though modal skepticism and expressivism are typical non-cognitivist op-
tions of the fi eld, one might not want to do without the truth and falseness of 
modal sentences. In that case, one shall accept the other horn of the concep-
tual dilemma, namely that modal notions express concepts. The question is, of 
course, whether these concepts are irreducibly and genuinely modal concepts, 
or they are reducible to something else. Walking the fi rst line, one ends up 
with a version of modalism (pursued by Graeme Forbes, Charles Chihara, and 
Jonathan Lowe) varying in how the ultimate nature of modal facts is conceived.
Fearing some conceptual and metaphysical disaster of admitting ir-
reducible modal facts to our worldview, one shall try to reduce genuine 
modal notions to other ones. Here one has again two typical choices: 
either use the machinery of possible worlds or try to do without it in a 
sense. Accepting possible-worlds talk one might choose (i) modal real-
ism, (ii) ersatzism, (iii) fi ctionalism, or (iv) agnosticism.
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Modal realists, like David Lewis, accept both possible-worlds talk and 
the ontological commitment to possible worlds; they regard them as con-
crete, spatiotemporal entities, just like our world (92–102). Ersatzists ac-
cept likewise the talk and the ontological commitment but dispense with 
concrete worlds in favor of various abstracts representations of the ways our 
world could have been. Both fi ctionalism and agnosticism admit the useful-
ness of possible-world talk, but they are antirealist or agnostic regarding 
the existence of other (either concrete or abstract) worlds than ours. They 
developed various ways of how we can talk about possible worlds without 
committing ourselves to the existence of those worlds that we talk about 
and utilize in our analysis of modal expressions.
Finally, as Borghini shows (157–172), though “[p]possible worlds suit the 
two modalities of necessity and possibility and are in accordance with the se-
mantics suggested to complement both [quantifi ed modal logic] and [Lewis’s] 
counterpart theory” (159), many would not admit possible worlds beyond 
the purely logical theories of modality. The most recent account of possibil-
ity and necessity utilizes only what is to be found in our actual world: the 
ersatzism is also known as actualism, the new modal actualism (or hardcore 
modal actualism) is more radical in leaving behind all talk and ontology of 
possible worlds, dealing only with “talk of modalities that are possessed by 
individuals, such as essences, dispositions, or other modal properties” (158). 
Individual and property essentialism, along with dispositionalism is intro-
duced in other to present the most tenable options of the book.
Borghini’s discussion is closed with a short chapter on the notion of ne-
cessity and necessary existents as developed by Timothy Williamson (185–
186), approaching also the relation of grounding (182–184), Meinongianism 
(187–190), and impossible worlds (190–192).
These chapters are well-written and well-structured: they are organized 
around four basic questions that always recur in the context of the theories of 
modality that are on the table: (1) What does it take for a certain situation to 
be possible? (2) What does it mean to say that a certain situation is possible? 
(3), How do we come to know that which is possible? (4) What sort of entity is 
a possible entity? In fact, (2), (3), and (4) are just the semantic, epistemic, and 
metaphysical sub-questions of (1), that is, of the “The Problem of Possibility” 
(3). Since the book is an introduction to the metaphysics of modality, (1) and 
(4) are the most favored questions, though occasionally (2) and (3) are also 
treated by the author. The various solutions (nineteen after all) provided by 
the different modal theories are gathered together at the end of the book 
(195–197), helping thus the reader to keep up with the main points of a given 
theory among the many arguments and reasons pro and contra of it.
According to Borghini (196–197), there are two main lessons to be drawn 
from the discussion of the metaphysical theories of modality. Firstly, at the 
moment no one can provide a full-blown theory that is able to entirely reduce 
the modal vocabulary to any type of non-modal vocabulary. It is a further 
question whether the non-reductive character of the various theories provides 
a fatal blow to possible-worlds theories, especially to modal realism, which 
main theoretical advantage supposed to be its alleged reductive approach. 
If “some modal entities are nonetheless here to stay” (196), one might temp to 
restrict her attention to the actual world and dispense with all of the possible-
worlds talk and machinery in the philosophically relevant discussions.
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The other lesson is that “a piecemeal approach to the metaphysical (and, 
arguably, philosophical) analysis of modality has the best payoffs” (197). 
Borghini seems to suggest that the different modal theories should be apt 
for different versions of modalities, like deontic, alethic, nomic, and meta-
physical. Fair enough—though one shall weigh the costs and benefi ts of the 
pluralistic and monistic/unifi ed accounts.
What need to be emphasized are some misleading and quite unneces-
sary features of the book. Borghini’s fi rst chapter, which supposed to be 
a historical overview, is everything but a historical overview in the usual 
and relevant sense of “historical overview”. The author discusses the well-
known views and paradoxes of Parmenides and Zeno, the theories of Aris-
totle, the Megarian School, the Arabic and Scholastic traditions, and the 
considerations of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume. The list is quite 
impressive, especially given that the overview is twenty-fi ve pages long (it 
is already the longest chapter)—counting the numbers, one might see that 
most fi gures got half of a page or just two-three pages.
If one may argue that such histories are histories of problems and not 
exegetical inquiries (thus legitimating the quite general and broadly con-
ceived treatments), then one could expect that these fi gures and their solu-
tions will occur later in the text—that is not happening, after all. Though 
Borghini notes that “it is diffi cult to understand the work of a prominent 
contemporary author in the fi eld, David Lewis, without reading Hume’s 
work” (45), it is quite debatable whether in what sense could Hume be rel-
evant for the discussion of Lewis or whether Lewis ever studied Hume in 
details, or just mobilized the Humean insights of his teacher, Quine. It is 
quite possible that one could be a good Lewisian or could solve some prob-
lems of Lewis without ever encountering herself with Hume’s philosophy.
After all, however, a story is needed, of course, but the reader may have 
found it more useful to get a narrative of the twentieth-century history of 
the modalities. Quantifi ed modal logic and its possible-worlds semantics 
caused many debates on both sides of the Atlantic and across Europe, and 
dealing with it in a more detailed manner could have helped the reader 
to appreciate their contemporary estimation. Perhaps then one should not 
face such admittedly bizarre sentences, as “[t]oday, we can claim that the 
conceptual machinery of possible-worlds semantics enabled an analysis of 
the various modal expressions, and of their conceptual ties, that is much 
more profound than the analyses provided by any other society or civiliza-
tion up until this point” (88).
Despite the historical parts, Andrea Borghini’s introductory textbook is 
a useful and thorough reading for anyone interested in the current analytic-
philosophical theories of and approaches to modality. It is the most up-to-
date and comprehensive survey of those options that one shall weigh when 
enters the contemporary debate. The pleasure of choosing between the theo-
ries is, as Borghini says (197), of course, ours.
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